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Abstract This study addresses a fundamental concern of
research on economic ethics by examining the values of
economics. While other studies have linked the study of
economics to the adoption of rational economic behavior,
this study goes one level deeper, investigating the values
that underpin neoclassical economics and whether they are
transmitted to students. We find that the study of eco-
nomics is associated with an increase in hedonism and
power values, a decrease self-direction value, and possibly
a decrease in universalism value. We measure value
change among economics students using a quasi-experi-
mental research design in accordance with the methodol-
ogy of research on academic socialization. We discuss the
practical implications of the internalization of economic
values.
Keywords Economics  Economics education  Homo
economicus  Values
Introduction
Understanding the values of economics has been a funda-
mental concern of research on economic ethics (Hirschman
1977; Sen 1987; Nelson 2006). While prior studies have
investigated the values of economics by measuring the
impact of neoclassical economics education on the rational
economic behavior of students (e.g., Frank et al. 1993;
Lynnette and Davis 2004; Wang et al. 2011), this study
goes one level deeper. This study investigates the values of
economics by assessing the impact of economics educa-
tion, not on student behavior, but on changes in student
values. Drawing on economic and sociological theories, we
propose that the study of economics is likely to result in an
increase in the priority of hedonism and power values and a
decrease in the priority of universalism and self-direction
values.
Previous studies have typically examined the impact of
economics education on student behaviors by using a cross-
sectional research design (e.g., Carter and Irons 1991; Frey
and Meier 2005), which does not permit deriving infer-
ences about attribute changes over time. We measure
changes in the values of economics students over time and
control the measurement of student value change for the
confounding effects of students’ socio-demographic and
academic characteristics in accordance with the theoretical
models of academic socialization (Weidman 1989; Pas-
carella and Terenzini 2005).
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section,
we discuss the values of economics. We then outline the
methods used in our study and present the results of the
data analyses. We conclude by discussing the practical
implications of our findings.
The Values of Economics
Human values are enduring normative beliefs that guide
human actions, such as behaviors, attitudes, and mental
processes (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). In an influential
contribution to value conceptualization, Rokeach (1973)
defined values as normative beliefs about how life ought to
be. A value is a normative belief ‘‘that a specific mode of
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially
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preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or
end-state of existence’’ (Rokeach 1973: 5). As normative
beliefs about desirable modes of action, values cannot be
reduced to a property of an object, such as its economic
value or cost, or to a particular behavior, such as utility
maximization in economic valuation studies. Values are
normative beliefs that serve the interests of society and
guide the selection, evaluation, and justification of human
actions (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992).
In contrast to attitudes, which tend to be context speci-
fic, values are relatively enduring and systematically guide
human actions across distinct contexts (Rokeach 1973).
The enduring, trans-contextual property of values means
that they change gradually over longer periods of time
(Bardi et al. 2009). For example, people tend to experience
value change during their long-term involvement in new
social and vocational experiences (Hitlin and Piliavin
2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In institutions of higher
education, students undergo value change by aligning their
values with the normative priorities of an academic field of
study (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005).
Neoclassical economists conceive of economics as an
objective science that is devoid of human values (Friedman
1953; Samuelson 1963). Inspired by the positivist
assumptions of natural science, economics is conceived as
a science that provides generalizations based on empirical
facts and deals with what ‘‘is’’ rather than what ‘‘ought to
be’’ (Friedman 1953). As a positive science, economics
studies ‘‘human behavior as a relationship between ends
and scarce means’’ without regard for the value assump-
tions of the ends that are pursued (Robbins 1935: 15).
Thus, an understanding of the values that underpin eco-
nomics is irrelevant because the values do not affect the
predictive power of the phenomena that economics intends
to explain (Friedman 1953).
Nonetheless, economics is recognized as being embed-
ded in the values of homo economicus (rational economic
individual), who calculates and uses the most effective
means available for the pursuit of a desired end (Hollis and
Nell 1975). The whole universe of theoretical concepts in
neoclassical economics is based on the assumption of the
instrumentally rational behavior of homo economicus
(Ferraro et al. 2005; Dierksmeier 2011). Economics thus
not only develops generalizations about individual behav-
ior, but also shapes the behavior of those individuals who
apply its principles and are thereby guided by its values
(Weber 1978; Racko 2011).
Research has linked the study of economics to an
increase in instrumentally rational behavior. Economics
education is associated with an increase in instrumentally
rational behavior in hypothetical scenarios where partici-
pants have to report a billing mistake (Frank et al. 1993;
Yezer et al. 1996), divide money among themselves (Carter
and Irons 1991), and contribute money to a university
public fund (Frey and Meier 2005). Economics students are
more likely than students of other disciplines to engage in
free-riding behaviors (Marwell and Ames 1981) and to
endorse the morality of greed as an extreme form of
instrumentally rational behavior (Wang et al. 2011). Sim-
ilarly, compared to students of other disciplines, business
students tend to be more instrumentally rational regarding
management ethics (Huehn 2014), more dishonest in their
studies (Lynnette and Davis 2004), and more likely to
experience an increase in the priority of self-interested
behaviors, such as shareholder value maximization, during
a study (Aspen Institute 2001). Students are particularly
likely to adopt instrumentally rational behaviors and goals
in academic programs where the curriculum is homoge-
nously structured by the values of homo economicus, such
as programs that place a higher emphasis on the principles
of game theory and industrial organization (Frank et al.
1993) and in which students are less exposed to classes in
other social sciences and the humanities (Racko et al.
2016). While some studies have found that economics
students are already more instrumentally rational than other
students at the beginning of their academic programs
(Carter and Irons 1991; Frey and Meier 2005), other studies
suggest that an increase in instrumentally rational behavior
during a course of study cannot be explained in terms of
students’ self-selection into an economics program based
on their pre-enrollment behavior (Frank et al. 1993; Wang
et al. 2011).
Prior studies have mostly investigated the normative
impact of economics education by measuring changes in
student behaviors without examining changes in the values
that underpin economics. Instrumentally rational behavior
is likely to be guided by the values of economics, but it
may not be reducible to them alone (Hollis and Nell 1975;
Ferraro et al. 2005; Weber 1978). While values are moti-
vationally enduring beliefs that remain stable across dis-
tinct contexts and change gradually over longer periods of
time, behaviors are more context specific and more
dependent on external reinforcement (Rokeach 1973). For
example, individuals may only engage in instrumentally
rational behavior in social contexts where such behavior is
incentivized, such as with extrinsic rewards. Also, the
normative effect of the internalization of economic values
may already be manifested at a stage at which individuals
think in an instrumentally rational way rather than just at
the stage at which calculative thinking predisposes indi-
viduals to engage in instrumentally rational behaviors.
Moreover, previous studies have largely focused on the
basic conceptual characteristics of rational economic
behavior, such as the pursuit of self-interest or free-riding,
and have rarely contemplated conceptual insights that
consider the values of homo economicus at a higher level
G. Racko
123
of abstraction. We draw on the more abstract economic and
sociological conceptualizations on the values of homo
economicus to examine the impact of the study of eco-
nomics on student values.
Hedonism
The values of economics emphasize the pursuit of hedo-
nism (Drakopoulos 1991; Dierksmeier 2011). Jeremy
Bentham assumed that people were motivated exclusively
by the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain
(Bentham 1823). John Stuart Mill relied on Bentham to
conceptualize pleasure maximization as a motivational
foundation of a particular form of action, namely rational
economic action of homo economicus, instead of all forms
of action as Bentham proposed (Mill 1874/1967). Nine-
teenth-century marginalist economists incorporated Ben-
tham’s principles of hedonistic pursuit by conceptually
linking the maximization of economic utility to the maxi-
mization of pleasure. For example, homo economicus was
conceived as maximizing utility by increasing the ratio of
pleasure to pain (Jevons 1871/1970), thus seeking the
greatest possible satisfaction of the individual’s wants
(Walras 1874/1965) and pursuing a maximum of pleasur-
able ends using a minimal investment of means (Edge-
worth 1881).
The subsequent formalization of economic theory based
on the assumptions of positivism resulted in the gradual
replacement of the concept of ‘‘hedonistic maximization’’
with the concepts of ‘‘utility’’ and ‘‘satisfaction’’ (Lewin
1996). Pareto (1971) and Fisher (1912) sought to exclude
hedonism values from economic theory by using positivist
methodology to study the satisfaction of wants and inter-
ests. Leading neoclassical economists of the twentieth
century, such as Hicks and Samuelson, attempted to further
purify economics from hedonism values by replacing the
concepts of ‘‘utility’’ and ‘‘satisfaction’’ with the suppos-
edly more value-neutral concepts of ‘‘preferences’’ and
‘‘observable behavior.’’ Samuelson (1963: 91) observed
that ‘‘there has been a shift in emphasis away from the
physiological and psychological hedonistic, introspective
aspects of utility. It is not merely that the modern econo-
mist replaces experienced sensation or satisfaction with
anticipated sensation… But much more than this, many
writers have ceased to believe in the existence of any
introspective magnitude or quantity of a cardinal, numeri-
cal kind.’’ However, despite the attempts to exclude
hedonism values from economic theory, the maximization
of pleasure in the form of satisfaction continued to be
implicitly recognized as an inescapable assumption of
rational economic behavior (Drakopoulos 1991; Hirata
2009). In neoclassical economics, rational consumers and
producers are widely presumed to maximize their
satisfaction by purchasing goods and making a profit
(Becker 1976). Therefore, our first research question (RQ)
is as follows:
RQ1 Does the study of economics result in an increase in
the value of hedonism?
Power
Economics is also underpinned by the pursuit of power.
Because the behavior of the rational economic individual
(homo economicus) is guided by use of the most effective
means to a desired end, the efficiency of such behavior is
logically contingent on the individual’s ability to exercise
power over the means necessary to attain that end (Racko
2011; Weber 1978). For example, a rational individual
exercises power over means by selecting and mobilizing
resources, such as people or knowledge, that enable this
individual to attain a desired end, such as profit. Since the
end for a rational economic individual is merely a means to
further ends in the infinite chain of means–ends calculation,
this individual seeks power as both a means and an end. For
example, the surplus wealth that has been generated in
prior business ventures can be used as a resource in the
development of new ventures.
The concern of economics with maximization of the
predictive power of its generalizations was recognized by
John Stuart Mill and has also been recognized by con-
temporary economic and social theorists. According to Mill
(1874/1967), economics seeks to increase the predictive
power of generalizations about the means necessary for
maximizing wealth. He notes that economics ‘‘considers
mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming
wealth’’ and seeks to explain the causes of this effect ‘‘to
obtain the power of either controlling or predicting the
effect’’ [emphasis added] (Mill 1874/1967: 321). He also
notes that the explanatory power of economic predictions is
likely to increase with the use of these predictions in the
explanation of human behavior. As the values of homo
economicus become institutionalized by using economic
generalizations to explain phenomena, human behavior in
the phenomenal world becomes increasingly guided by
economic values and thus more aligned with the predic-
tions of neoclassical economics.
Because the generalizations of neoclassical economics
not only explain but also shape phenomena in accordance
with the values that underpin them, the explanatory power
of generalizations increases with their utilization in the
prediction of human behavior (Persky 1995; Thaler 2000).
The higher the explanatory power of generalizations in
terms of their fit to the empirical phenomena, the more
phenomena can be predicted and controlled in accordance
with those generalizations (Ferraro et al. 2005). Therefore,
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the more individuals are guided by the values of eco-
nomics, the more they can be predictably controlled by the
allocation of economic incentives, such as performance-
related pay, to which they are likely to be responsive
(Kasser et al. 2007). We thus propose the following
research question:
RQ2 Does the study of economics result in an increase in
the value of power?
Universalism
Individuals who are guided by the values of homo eco-
nomicus are likely to attribute low importance to the value
of universalism, which emphasizes concern for social well-
being and the preservation of nature. The assumption that
the pursuit of self-interest occurs at the expense of pro-
social concerns is widely recognized in economic theory
(Ferraro et al. 2005). This assumption has been used to
justify the self-interested maximization of wealth as the
ultimate and only end of rational economic behavior
(Hirschman 1977; Sen 1987). In neoclassical economics,
instrumentally rational individuals are assumed to maxi-
mize wealth by selling products and services to willing
buyers regardless of the costs that the other parties may
incur (Samuelson 1963). Therefore, the unintended effect
of instrumentally rational behavior, such as the emergence
of a global financial crisis due to the unrestrained pursuit of
profit in the banking industry, is conceived simply as an
externality for the affected parties (Buchanan and Stub-
blebine 1962; Akerlof and Shiller 2009).
The maximization of self-interest undermines the concern
for the common good. Fontrodona and Sison (2006) demon-
strate that the opportunistic pursuit of self-interest by the
shareholders and managers of a firm can weaken their moral
concern regarding the formation of a community of relation-
ships that preserves the intrinsic worth and dignity of its
members. For example, self-interested managers may gener-
ate amoral hazard for shareholderswhen they shirk their tasks
and transfer the costs of their actions onto shareholders.
Miller (1999: 1056) suggests that individuals who act in
an instrumentally rational way de-emphasize concern for
the well-being of others because the pursuit of ethical goals
is irrational and only leads to ‘‘a waste of time and effort’’
and because of a fear that they may be taken advantage of.
Individuals who internalize the principles of instrumentally
rational behavior are more likely to believe ‘‘in the per-
vasiveness, appropriateness, and desirability of self-inter-
ested behavior, which, in turn, should lead to exhibiting
more self-interested behavior’’ (Ferraro et al. 2005: 14).
The results of bargaining-game experiments demonstrate
that people are more likely to use instrumentally rational
strategies of action when they expect others to act in the
same way (Molinsky et al. 2012). Individuals guided by
instrumentally rational strategies adopt lower ethical work
standards (Giacalone et al. 2008) and avoid the emotions of
social empathy (Eisenberg 2000). Thus, we propose the
following research question:
RQ3 Does the study of economics result in a decrease in
the value of universalism?
Self-Direction
Individuals who have internalized economic values are also
likely to attribute low importance to the value of self-di-
rection. Weber (1978) highlights that the acquisition of the
values of homo economicus results in the homogenization
of individual actions according to the logic of means–ends
calculation. Economic calculation systematically quantifies
phenomena in terms of means and ends and weighs means
in terms of their efficiency for attainment of a given end. It
thus reduces an individual choice to the selection of means
toward a rationally defined end. It conceives non-economic
ends either as irrational obstacles or as means that can be
exploited to achieve a rationally defined end. The inter-
nalization of the principles of economic calculation thus
standardizes human actions by increasing their consistency,
calculability, and predictability in accordance with the
logic of instrumentally rational calculation.
Dierksmeier (2011) suggests that the values of homo
economicus restrict individual freedom for utility maxi-
mization. He suggests that rational economic calculation
limits individual autonomy by reducing individual action to
a passive response to the necessities of pleasure maxi-
mization, by excluding the alternative forms of decision-
making, and by restricting the conceptual understanding of
human action to the determinism of causal predictions
about rational economic behavior. It thus reduces human
agency to the structures of thought that are embedded in the
principles of homo economicus and the necessities of
economic laws derived from these principles.
The homogenizing implications of rational economic
action are also recognized in psychological research.
Riesman et al. (1970) demonstrate that individuals guided
by the values of homo economicus sacrifice their autonomy
by maximizing their usefulness to contemporaries.
According to the research based on self-determination
theory, the adoption of the values of homo economicus,
which emphasize the extrinsic orientation to activity as a
means to an end, decreases intrinsic orientation to activity
as an end in itself (Kasser et al. 2007). Because rational
economic behavior is controlled by extrinsic rewards, such
as reputation and wealth, it decreases the self-direction of
individuals (Deci and Ryan 1987). Therefore, the following
research question is offered:
G. Racko
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RQ4 Does the study of economics result in a decrease in
the value of self-direction?
Method
Assumptions of Research
To ensure consistency between the conceptual and
methodological aspects of our study and to clarify the role
of our findings in policy development, it is important to
highlight our ontological and epistemological assumptions.
Following Max Weber’s methodology of social sciences,
we assume, ontologically, that values exist as an ultimate
reality (Weber 2011). Epistemologically, we reject the
positivist notion of an ‘‘objective’’ study of the human
world as an independent entity because any socio-scientific
inquiry is inescapably ‘‘value-relevant’’ or guided by a
priori values that determine the selection of a research
topic. Weber asserts that social scientists are inescapably
part of the ‘‘object’’ of their study and hence cannot access
the social realm without value presuppositions that guide
the selection and analysis of a research problem.
Because of the value-relevance of socio-scientific
inquiry, Weber stresses the importance of establishing
methodological checks that prevent uncontrolled intrusion
of scientists’ values in the assessment of empirical facts.
Above all, he calls for ‘‘value-free’’ social research in
which empirical facts are distinguished from the personal
value judgments of scientists. According to Weber, we can
empirically measure the values of a specific group of
individuals in value-free terms without endorsing or
opposing them. In the end, questions concerning the value
portrait of people can be settled only by providing empir-
ical evidence.
The value-fact distinction is also relevant in setting the
appropriate conceptual boundaries between science and
policy. Asserting that a meaningful understanding of human
activity requires differentiation between means and ends,
Weber (2011) notes that social science can decide only the
means but not the ends of action. It can thus rationally
decide what means are the most appropriate for attaining a
given policy goal. It can also ascertain the consequences of
application of specific means for goals that are not imme-
diately compatible with the policy goal. However, it cannot,
without drowning in the speculative non-scientific realm,
inform policy makers about the desirability of the goal or
rationally weigh desirable goals against each other. There-
fore, in appraising the practical implications of our findings,
we consider strategies that policy makers in universities can
use to facilitate awareness of the values of economics
without making value judgments about the desirability or
undesirability of these values.
Procedure and Participants
To examine the impact of economics education on student
values, we conducted a 1-year study of economics students
and a comparison group of politics students from the
University of Latvia, a leading higher education institution
in Latvia. We surveyed first- and second-year undergrad-
uate students at the beginning and end of the academic
year. To increase the proportion of surveyed students, we
administered the survey during the lectures or seminars
with the highest attendance. The average time required for
the students to complete the survey was 18–20 min. The
over-time data were obtained for 217 students, including
127 economics students and 90 politics students. Over-time
data were available for 71 and 75% of economics and
politics students, respectively. Of the students, 60.4 and
39.6% were in the first and second year, respectively, of
their undergraduate program. The average age of the stu-
dents was 19.3 years old, and 82% of the students was
female.
Methodology of Research of Academic Socialization
Previous studies of the normative impact of economics
education have been limited by a number of methodolog-
ical weaknesses. Most studies assess the socialization of
economics students by using a cross-sectional research
design and comparing the attributes of lower and higher
level students at a single point in time (e.g., Carter and
Irons 1991; Frey and Meier 2005). The use of a cross-
sectional design to measure student socialization is based
on the assumption that the socio-demographic character-
istics of lower and upper level students are similar. How-
ever, historical changes in student admission policies or the
applicant pool may lead to discrepancies in the character-
istics of upper and lower level students. The use of a cross-
sectional design also confounds measurement of the impact
of academic study on student values with the measurement
of value accentuation during the study, when values pri-
oritized at the beginning of the study are then strengthened
or accentuated during the study (Pascarella and Terenzini
2005). For example, value accentuation occurs when stu-
dents who attribute high importance to a specific value at
the beginning of the academic year experience an increase
in the priority of that value during the academic year.
Moreover, where prior studies have employed a longitu-
dinal research design, they have either measured the mean
attribute change of a whole student population (Yezer et al.
1996) or not controlled the measurement of attribute
change for the confounding influences of students’ socio-
demographic and academic characteristics (Frank et al.
1993; Frey and Meier 2005).
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We overcome the methodological limitations of prior
research by examining student value change over time in
accordance with a conceptual model of student socializa-
tion derived from the theoretical models of academic
socialization (Weidman 1989; Pascarella and Terenzini
2005). The model presented in Fig. 1 differentiates the
effect of student enrollment in an academic program
(economics vs. politics) on their values at Time 2 (arrow
b), controlling for the effect of their values at Time 1
(arrow c), from the value accentuation effect that occurs
when the values that are given higher or lower priority at
the beginning of the academic year are strengthened or
weakened during the academic year (arrow a). This model
also enables us to control assessment of the impact of
economics education on student value change for the
confounding effects of students’ socio-demographic char-
acteristics (i.e., sex, age, father’s education, mother’s
education, and residence in a capital city prior to the study)
and the confounding effects of student study characteristics
(i.e., time spent on study, class attendance, year of study,
residence during study, friendship with study peers, and
paid work during study). These characteristics are high-
lighted as potentially important confounding influences on
student value change in the models of academic social-
ization (Pascarella and Terenzini 2005).
Measures
Human Values
We measured hedonism, power, universalism, and self-di-
rection values using the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS)
(Schwartz 1992). The SVS’s ability to meaningfully pre-
dict goals, attitudes, and behaviors of different occupa-
tional and demographic groups has been validated in
different cultures (Schwartz 1992; Spini 2003; Bardi et al.
2009). The reliability of SVS has been confirmed using
test–retest and split-sample analyses (Schwartz and Sagiv
1995). SVS is also unaffected by socially desirable
response bias (Schwartz et al. 1997).
The defining goals of hedonism, power, universalism,
and self-direction values are, respectively, ‘‘pleasure and
sensuous gratification for oneself’’ (Schwartz 1992: 8),
‘‘social status and prestige, control or dominance over
people and resources’’ (Schwartz 1992: 9), ‘‘understanding,
appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all
people and for nature’’ (Schwartz 1992: 12), and ‘‘inde-
pendent thought and action—choosing, creating, explor-
ing’’ (Schwartz 1992: 6). Students completed a Latvian
version of SVS translated by Austers (2002). This trans-
lation of SVS has good dimensional validity and reliability
(Kalnina 2004; Racko 2011). Moreover, the dimensional
validity of SVS has been confirmed in more than 60
societies around the world (Spini 2003; Schwartz and
Boehnke 2004).
In the SVS, participants were asked to rate the impor-
tance of 57 values ‘‘as a guiding principle in my life’’ on a
9-point scale ranging from 7 (of supreme importance) to
-1 (opposed to my values). Value items were presented in
two lists containing 30 and 27 items, respectively. Before
rating the value items in each list, participants were asked
to indicate their most and least important values. As
Schwartz (1992) suggested, we used centered value scores
where the measurement of each value was centered based
on the mean ratings for all 57 value items.
The scale reliabilities for the measures of hedonism,
power, universalism, and self-direction values, which were
comprised of 3, 4, 8, and 5 items, respectively, were .72,
.71, .74, and .68 at Time 1 and .76, .73, .76, and .68 at Time
2. Considering that the scales included a relatively small
a b
c
Controls:
• Sex
• Age
• Father’s education  
• Mother’s education 
• Capital   
Controls:
• Time spent on study
• Class attendance
• Year of study
• Residence during study  
• Study peers as friends 
• Paid work during study 
Academic program: 
Economics vs. Politics     
Values at the end of 
academic year (Time 2) 
Values at the beginning of 
academic year (Time 1) 
Fig. 1 Model of academic value socialization
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number of items, these reliabilities indicated an adequate
level of internal consistency for the scale items (Hair et al.
2010). Prior studies have identified similar reliabilities for
the Schwartz value measures (Schwartz 1992; Bardi et al.
2009).
Controls
We controlled measurement of the effects of economics
education on student value change for a set of socio-de-
mographic and academic characteristics that were specified
in the conceptual model of academic value socialization
(Fig. 1). Gender was coded as 1 (female) or 0 (male). Age
was assessed on a 5-point interval scale ranging from ‘‘18
or fewer years of age’’ (1) to ‘‘22 or more years of age’’ (5).
Father’s and mother’s education was measured using a
5-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (primary or secondary
education) to 5 (advanced university degree). Residence in
a capital city before studies was coded as 1 (resided in
capital before studies) or 0 (did not reside in capital before
studies). Time spent on study was measured in terms of the
average number of hours per week spent on study. Class
attendance was measured by the percentage of attendance
of lectures and seminars on a 6-point scale ranging from
‘‘91–100%’’ (6) to ‘‘50% or less’’ (1). Year of study was
coded as 0 (first year) or 1 (second year). Residence during
study was coded as 0 (resides independently) or 1 (resides
with other students). Friendship with study peers was
measured as a proportion of friends among students using a
4-point ordinal scale ranging from ‘‘none’’ (0) to ‘‘all’’ (4).
Finally, paid work during study was measured as the
number of hours per week spent performing salaried work.
Results
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and cor-
relations of the study variables.
We proposed research questions focusing on whether
economics education is likely to result in an increase in
hedonism and power values as well as a decrease in uni-
versalism and self-direction values. In the first step of the
data analyses, we examined the impact of economics
education on student values by comparing the value
changes of economics students with the value changes of a
comparison group of politics students. Figures 2, 3, 4, and
5 provide the mean value scores of economics and politics
students at the beginning of the academic year (Time 1)
and at the end of the academic year (Time 2). The results of
a paired-samples t test indicated that economics students
attributed significantly higher importance to the values of
hedonism (t = -3.38, p\ .001) and power (t = -3.70,
p\ .001) and significantly lower importance to the value
of self-direction (t = 3.40, p\ .001) at Time 2, when
compared to Time 1. For politics students, there were no
significant differences in the mean importance of the value
of hedonism (t = 1.46, p = .146), power (t = 1.44,
p = .154), or self-direction (t = .53, p = .879) between
Times 1 and 2. The results of a two-way analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with repeated measures for the interaction
effect of study time and academic program indicated that
the identified patterns of change in hedonism, power, and
self-direction values among economics students were sig-
nificantly different from those of politics students: hedo-
nism [F(1, 215) = 11.11, p = .001], power [F(1,
215) = 12.35, p = .001], and self-direction [F(1,
215) = 4.12, p = .04]. However, neither economics nor
politics students showed any changes in the mean impor-
tance of the universalism value between Time 1 and Time
2 (t = 1.34, p = .183; t = -1.06, p = .291). The identi-
fied pattern of stability in the universalism value over time
among economics students was not significantly different
from that of politics students [F(1, 215) = 2.83, p = .09].
In the second step of the data analyses, we used ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression to examine the effects of
economics education on values at Time 2 in the presence of
controls for the effects of student background characteris-
tics, including values at Time 1, as well as academic
characteristics that are specified in the model of academic
value socialization (arrows b and c in Fig. 1). The study of
economics had a significant positive effect on the hedonism
value (b = .15, p = .039) and power value (b = .20,
p = .003, and a significant negative effect on the self-di-
rection value (b = -.15, p = .026) at Time 2 (see
Table 2). There was also a near significant trend for the
negative effect of economics education on the universalism
value at Time 2 (b = -.14, p = .069). Inspection of the
standardized regression coefficients for these effects sug-
gests that economics education had a relatively weak effect
on student value change.
In accordance with the model of academic value
socialization, we further explored the possibility that value
change among economics students might result from the
accentuation or strengthening of value differences at the
beginning of the study period (arrow a in Fig. 1). The
results of an ANOVA, however, indicated that economics
and politics students did not differ on any of the values at
Time 1: hedonism [F(1, 216) = .01, p = .98], power [F(1,
216) = .28, p = .60], universalism [F(1, 216) = .97,
p = .33], and self-direction [F(1, 216) = 1.01, p = .31].
The results of a binary logistic regression indicated that,
above and beyond the effects of students’ socio-demo-
graphic characteristics, hedonism, power, and universalism
values at Time 1 did not predict their enrollment in the
economics program (p[ .05) (see Table 3). However, the
self-direction value at Time 1 had a significant negative
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association with student enrollment in the economics pro-
gram (B = -.53, Wald statistic = 4.85, p\ .05). Thus,
our findings suggest that the identified effects of economics
education on changes in hedonism, power, and universal-
ism values cannot be explained in terms of the accentuation
of initial differences in these values. However, compared to
Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations of study variables
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Hedonism Time 1a .33 1.06
2. Hedonism Time 2a .47 1.10 .52***
3. Power Time 1a -.99 1.26 .28*** .14*
4. Power Time 2a -.84 1.21 .29*** .18** .61***
5. Universalism Time 1a -.36 .52 -.25*** -.17* -.35*** -.42***
6. Universalism Time 2a -.38 .75 -.22** -.25*** -.23*** -.41*** .49***
7. Self-direction Time 1a .65 .67 -.12 -.03 -.08 -.05 .01 .02
8. Self-direction Time 2a .54 .70 -.16* -.10 -.02 -.16* .10 .01 .61***
9. Sexb .82 .38 -.02 .07 -.10 -.13 .01 .09 -.04 -.09
10. Age 3.15 .82 .06 .01 .17* .08 -.02 -.04 -.06 -.01 .07
11. Father’s educationc 2.85 1.30 .05 .00 .07 .06 -.06 .04 .01 -.08 .08
12. Mother’s educationc 3.14 1.32 -.06 -.11 .13 .08 -.03 .06 .03 -.09 -.03
13. Capitald .42 .49 .08 .01 .07 .04 .00 .01 -.02 -.07 -.02
14. Time spent on study 8.44 8.23 -.01 -.14* .05 .00 -.03 .04 .13 .17* .08
15. Class attendance 5.12 1.13 -.13 -.13 .02 -.18** .15* .19* .00 .08 .11
16. Year of studye .40 .49 -.09 -.03 .09 -.08 .12 .05 -.06 .02 .04
17. Study peers as friends 1.92 .55 .11 .17* .12 .05 .04 -.16 -.06 .01 .06
18. Paid work during study 10.42 14.98 .07 -.01 .09 .23*** -.14* -.01 -.08 -.15* .02
19. Economics programf .59 .49 -.09 .12 -.07 .14* .03 -.08 -.14* -.25*** -.03
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1. Hedonism Time 1
2. Hedonism Time 2
3. Power Time 1
4. Power Time 2
5. Universalism Time 1
6. Universalism Time 2
7. Self-direction Time 1
8. Self-direction Time 2
9. Sex
10. Age
11. Father’s education .02
12. Mother’s education -.16 .33***
13. Capital .07 .21** .06
14. Time spent on study .06 .00 -.06 -.10
15. Class attendance .03 -.08 -.03 -.07 .22***
16. Year of study .49*** .06 .05 .00 -.06 .19**
17. Study peers as friends .02 .07 .04 .01 -.05 .04 .14*
18. Paid work during study .25** .12 .08 .12 -.09 -.27*** .10 -.02
19. Economics program -.14* .06 .04 .20** -.32*** -.27*** -.20** -.06 -.06
N = 192–217 (due to missing values in demographic variables)
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01; *** p\ .001
a Higher value score indicates greater importance; b 1 = female, 0 = male; c higher score = higher educational level; d 1 = resided in capital
before studies, 0 = did not reside in capital; e 1 = second year, 0 = first year; f 1 = economics program, 0 = politics program
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a group of politics students, economics students did place
lower value on self-direction at the beginning of the aca-
demic year and subsequently experienced a decrease in the
same value during the academic year.1 Discussion
We examined the effects of the study of economics on
changes in student values. Using a quasi-experimental
research design, we compared the value changes of eco-
nomics students with a comparison group of politics stu-
dents. Drawing on the theoretical models of academic
socialization, we controlled the analyses of the impact of
economics education on student value change for the
effects of students’ socio-demographic and academic
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Fig. 4 Mean scores of universalism value at the beginning (Time 1)
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Fig. 5 Mean scores of self-direction value at the beginning (Time 1)
and the end (Time 2) of academic year for economics and politics
students
1 To increase the internal validity of our findings, we regressed the
academic program (economics vs. politics) on Time 1 values together
with students’ socio-demographic and academic characteristics,
including year of study. Consistent with the results of the initial
regression analyses, where the study program was regressed on Time
1 values and students’ socio-demographic characteristics, the findings
of binary logistic regression indicated that self-direction value at
Time 1 was negatively associated with student enrollment in the
economics program (B = -.54, Wald statistic = 3.74, p = .05).
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characteristics. Above and beyond the effects of control
variables, economics education was associated with an
increase in the importance of hedonism and power values
and a decrease in the importance of self-direction value.
There was also a near significant tendency for economics
students to experience a decrease of universalism value.
Below, we consider theoretical and practical implications
of our findings.
Theoretical Implications
Prior studies have typically linked the internalization of
economic values with the pursuit of instrumentally rational
behavior in general and have rarely considered theoretical
insights into the values that underpin this form of behavior
(e.g., Frank et al. 1993; Yezer et al. 1996; Wang et al.
2011). This study contributes to the understanding of the
values of economics by examining the impact of eco-
nomics education on student value change.
Consistent with the findings of prior studies that link
economics education to an increase in instrumentally
rational behaviors (Frank et al. 1993; Wang et al. 2011), we
find the study of economics to be associated with an
increase in the value of power. We suggest that the inter-
nalization of the values of homo economicus during neo-
classical economics education strengthens power goals by
emphasizing the importance of control over the means
Table 2 Hierarchical regression analyses predicting values at Time 2
Hedonism Power Universalism Self-direction
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
Hedonism Time 1a .53 (.06)*** .56 (.06)*** – – – – – –
Power Time 1a – – .60 (.06)*** .61 (.06)*** – – – –
Universalism Time 1a – – – – .50 (.09)*** .52 (.09)*** – –
Self-direction Time 1a – – – – – .61 (.06)*** .57 (.06)***
Sexb .06 (.18) .07 (.18) -.05 (.19) -.04 (.18) .06 (.12) .05 (.12) -.07 (.11) -.09 (.11)
Age -.02 (.08) -.02 (.10) -.03 (.09) .02 (.10) -.02 (.06) -.05 (.07) .00 (.05) -.02 (.06)
Father’s educationc .03 (.07) .02 (.06) .03 (.06) .01 (.06) .07 (.04) .07 (.04) -.07 (.04) -.07 (.04)
Mother’s educationc -.09 (.07) -.10 (.06) -.03 (.06) -.03 (.06) .07 (.04) .07 (.04) -.08 (.03) -.08 (.03)
Capitald -.04 (.14) -.10 (.06) -.01 (.15) -.07 (.14) -.02 (.10) .02 (.10) -.03 (.09) .01 (.09)
Time spent on study -.10 (.14) .03 (.01) -.04 (.00) .08 (.00)
Class attendance -.04 (.01) -.08 (.07) .11 (.05) .01 (.04)
Year of studye .11 (.07) -.11 (.17) -.05 (.12) .05 (.10)
Study peers as friends .10 (.17) .00 (.13) -.17 (.09)** .00 (.08)
Paid work during study -.07 (.13) .20 (.00)** .08 (.00) -.11 (.00)
Economics programf .15 (.06)* .20 (.16)** -.14 (.11)# -.15 (.10)*
R2 .30 .38 .38 .47 .26 .32 .40 .45
F 13.00*** 8.84*** 16.09*** 12.55*** 10.58*** 6.71*** 19.73*** 11.62***
DR2 .28 .34 .34 .43 .24 .27 .38 .41
N = 192–217 (due to missing values in demographic variables)
# p = .069; * p\ .05; ** p\ .01; *** p\ .001
a Higher value score indicates greater importance; b 1 = female, 0 = male; c higher score = higher educational level; d 1 = resided in capital
before studies, 0 = did not reside in capital, e 1 = second year, 0 = first year; f 1 = economics program, 0 = politics program
Table 3 Binary logistic regression analysis predicting enrollment in
economics program
Wald statistic (SE in parentheses)
Hedonism T1 2.78 (.16)
Power T1 .26 (.14)
Universalism T1 .05 (.32)
Self-direction T1 4.85 (.24)*
Sexa .01 (.41)
Age 4.05 (.20)*
Father’s educationb .25 (.13)
Mother’s educationb .00 (.13)
Capitalc 7.53 (.33)**
Cox and Snell R2 .10
Nagelkerke R2 .14
N = 192–217 (due to missing values in demographic variables)
* p\ .05; ** p\ .01; *** p\ .001
a 1 = female, 0 = male; b higher score = higher educational level;
c 1 = resided in capital before studies, 0 = did not reside in capital
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necessary to attain a given end (Ferraro et al. 2005; Racko
2011).
We also find the study of economics to be associated
with an increase in the value of hedonism and a decrease in
the value of self-direction. We suggest that internalization
of the values of homo economicus may predispose indi-
viduals to maximize their utility by maximizing their sat-
isfaction (Drakopoulos 1991; Lewin 1996) and to
homogenize their actions in accordance with the calcula-
tive logic of rational economic thinking (Dierksmeier
2011).
Furthermore, we differentiate measurement of the
impact of economics education on student value change
from the measurement of value accentuation during the
study, where the latter is associated with the strengthening
or weakening of values that are more or less prioritized at
the beginning of the study period. Consistent with the
results of prior studies on the normative impact of eco-
nomics education (Frank et al. 1993; Wang et al. 2011), we
find that value change during the study of economics is, in
general, not associated with the strengthening or weaken-
ing of values at the beginning of the study period.
Specifically, we find no significant differences in power,
hedonism, or universalism values between economics and
politics students at the beginning of the study. However,
our findings suggest that economics students experienced
the accentuation of initial differences in self-direction
values. These students attributed lower importance to self-
direction at the beginning of their academic study and
experienced a decrease in the priority of this value during
the study period.
Practical Implications
In industrially advanced societies, economic values have
increasingly dominated policy development in private and
public sectors and have been critical for increasing the
material well-being and generosity of people. Using
nationally representative survey data for the 81 societies
representing 85% of the world’s population, Inglehart and
Welzel (2005) report that in economically developed
societies with higher levels of material wealth and afflu-
ence, people are likely to be more concerned with the well-
being of others. They suggest that people in affluent soci-
eties tend to be more pro-social because they are less
constrained by the material necessities of survival. How-
ever, the values of homo economicus have also been used
to legitimize the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest with-
out regard for others’ well-being (Ghoshal 2005; Ferraro
et al. 2005; Huehn 2008). Since values that individuals
internalize during academic study are likely to guide their
vocational decisions after graduation (Pascarella and
Terenzini 2005), it is important to consider the ethical
implications of the transmission of these values. Below, we
outline a number of strategies that policy makers in uni-
versities can use to help students act ethically by raising
their awareness of the values that underpin economics.
Policy makers may facilitate awareness of the values of
economics by highlighting the normative assumptions of
positive economics in classes focusing on the methodology
and philosophy of economics. Neoclassical economics is
traditionally taught as a positive science that examines the
social world as an objective entity independent of value
assumptions about it. It develops predictions based on
empirical facts without making value judgments about the
desirability or undesirability of these facts (Friedman
1953). The prevailing view is that neoclassical economics
excludes ethical and moral phenomena from the develop-
ment of its predictions. However, because economics
selectively abstracts its predictions based on those aspects
of behavior that are guided by the values of homo eco-
nomicus, it not only predicts phenomena but also shapes
them in accordance with its values (Hollis and Nell 1975;
Dierksmeier 2011).
Policy makers can increase student understanding of the
normative and ethical implications of economics by clari-
fying the motivations that underpin, or are opposed to, the
values of homo economicus. An awareness of motivational
compatibilities and conflicts between the values that
underpin instrumentally rational and non-rational modes of
action can enable students to make an ethical choice among
distinct ends of action, as well as raise their awareness of
means that can facilitate or constrain the attainment of
selected ends. Our findings suggest that the study of eco-
nomics is likely to result in an increase in the priority of
hedonism and power values and a decrease in the priority
of self-direction value. While the study of economics may
enable individuals to be more effective in the acquisition
and utilization of resources, it is likely to constrain their
ability to make ethical choices between distinct ends by
reducing their actions to calculation of the means necessary
to attain an instrumentally rational end (Ferraro et al.
2005).
Clarification of economic values can also help students
make ethical choices about the use of the insights of eco-
nomics in policy development. It can help students
understand the internal logic and final axioms of value
premises that underpin the insights of neoclassical eco-
nomics and determine the intended and unintended con-
sequences of the use of these insights in the development of
corporate and public policies. For example, while the
deregulation of financial markets may increase the com-
petitiveness of economies, it can generate negative exter-
nalities in the form of a financial crisis or decreased
protection of workers’ rights. For example, it is now widely
recognized that the global financial crisis of 2007–2008
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was largely fueled by the deregulation of financial markets
that enabled corporate leaders to behave opportunistically
in the pursuit of their self-interest without considering the
ethical consequences of their actions (Akerlof and Shiller
2009).
Policy makers may also raise students’ awareness of the
ethical implications of the pursuit of economic values by
encouraging their enrollment in social science classes that
examine economic processes from diverse theoretical per-
spectives. Students can be encouraged to participate in
classes that draw on the insights of the political economy
perspective, where economics processes are considered in
conjunction with the political, social, and cultural pro-
cesses in society. Economics students can develop a more
reflexive and critical understanding of the political and
social implications of the use of economic theories by
attending classes in political theory, sociology, or philos-
ophy in political science departments or other social sci-
ence departments that expose students to diverse
conceptual perspectives (Giacalone and Thompson 2006).
The exposure of economics students to diverse theoretical,
ontological, and epistemological perspectives is likely to
facilitate their willingness and ability to reflect on the
values that underpin the insights of neoclassical economics,
therefore, to act ethically in the pursuit of these insights.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
The internal validity of our findings may be affected by a
number of limitations associated with the research design.
Consistent with the methodology used in prior research on
the normative impact of economics education (Frank et al.
1993; Yezer et al. 1996; Lynnette and Davis 2004; Frey
and Meier 2005; Wang et al. 2011), we compare the nor-
mative socialization of economics students with the nor-
mative socialization of a comparison group of non-
economics students. In this way, we aim to develop a
generic understanding of the impact of economics educa-
tion on student values. However, we do not exclude the
possibility that the internalization of the values of homo
economicus during economics education can be influenced
by the normative homogenization or diversification of an
academic curriculum. For example, economics students
may be less likely to internalize economic values in aca-
demic departments that offer classes in other social sci-
ences and the humanities (Giacalone and Thompson 2006)
and that prioritize the recruitment of teaching staff with
interdisciplinary training in social sciences (Moosmayer
2012). Economics students may also be less likely to
internalize the values of homo economicus in academic
departments that de-emphasize the use of econometric
methods (Racko et al. 2016; Colander 2001) and the
principles of game theory (Frank et al. 1993).
We also cannot rule out the possibility that value change
in economics students may have been influenced by a
distinctive school of economic thought, such as, for
example, the Austrian School or the Stockholm School. It
is plausible that the theoretical or methodological research
perspective associated with a particular school of economic
thought of the economics department in which students
were enrolled influenced their value change above and
beyond the general effects of economics education. Future
research can investigate the moderating effect of the school
of economic thought on the internalization of economic
values.
Use of the methodology of research on academic social-
ization (Weidman 1989; Pascarella and Terenzini 2005)
enables us to overcome the limitations of prior research on
the normative impact of economics education. However, we
measure value changes only for first- and second-year stu-
dents. Future research can develop a more exhaustive
understanding of value socialization in economics education
by measuring value changes during an entire academic
program. Moreover, although we control the analyses of
student value changes for the confounding effects of stu-
dents’ socio-demographic and academic characteristics,
which are theoretically recognized as important antecedents
of value change during academic study (Pascarella and
Terenzini 2005), a number of potentially important control
variables may have been excluded. Future research can
control the analyses of the impact of economics education on
student values for the confounding influences of student
residence during study, engagement in extracurricular
activities, and interaction with academic staff.
We also cannot rule out the possibility that value change
during the study of economics may be influenced by a few
opinion leaders from the student body. However, the results
of multivariate data analyses indicate that economics stu-
dents experienced a distinct pattern of value change above
and beyond the effects of their year of enrollment in an
undergraduate program or their friendships with study
peers. Future research can examine value socialization in a
number of economics programs and control data analyses
for student interaction with opinion leaders.
Future research can also fruitfully investigate the per-
ceptions of academic policy makers and teaching staff
regarding the normative impact of economics education.
For example, it would be interesting to examine their
perceptions of the role of values in positive economics, the
desirability or undesirability of the internalization of these
values during economics education, and the normative
homogenization or diversification of academic curricula in
accordance with these values. This would be helpful for
economics and management programs seeking to facilitate
student awareness of the normative assumptions that
underpin economics.
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Research can also examine the impact of value social-
ization during economics education on the vocational
preferences and choices of graduates. For example, new
research can examine the impact of value change during
economics education on the employment of graduates in
organizations and occupations that prioritize the pursuit of
ethical business practices, such as protection of the well-
being of workers, ethical personnel management, and
charity fundraising.
Conclusion
This study examined the values of economics by investi-
gating the impact of economics education on student val-
ues. To facilitate an understanding of the fundamental
value assumptions of economics, we used insights of the
economic and sociological theories of the values of homo
economicus. Understanding the values of economics is
important, given that these values play a significant role in
the design of corporate policies. Economic values provide
normative guidelines for the mobilization of resources, the
management of employees, and the role of organizations in
society. While economic values dominate the development
of corporate policies in Western societies, their influence is
spreading worldwide. When economic values guide the
design of corporate policies, they shape the actions of
individuals who apply them and are affected by them. As
economic values are institutionalized in the world of work,
they transform human actions and interactions in accor-
dance with their principles. In illuminating the generic
values of economics, this study aimed to facilitate pur-
poseful and responsible selection among competing value
priorities to increase awareness of the ethical consequences
of this selection for individuals, organizations, and society.
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